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I. INTRODUCTION
He is fifty-one years old. Two of his children are in college and his
wife works full-time. He has been with his current employer for twenty
years. Lately his boss has been casually asking him when he plans to
retire. But the man's children are in school and he has a mortgage and
bills to pay; he does not plan to retire for another fifteen years. He
continues to resist retirement despite the fact that his employer begins
to talk more earnestly, maybe even coercively. His fellow employees
think he is past his prime and also pressure him to retire. His boss has
all but told him he will not advance any further in the company. His
work environment becomes so polluted with pro-retirement sentiment
that he finds his work performance suffering. He has few options as he
cannot afford to quit or take an early retirement package. Has this man
been a victim of age discrimination? He has neither been fired nor con-
structively discharged, but has his working environment become so
hostile that the conditions of his employment have been altered? Under
current law, this man has no legal recourse; however, under the hostile
environment cause of action this man has indeed been a victim of dis-
crimination based on age.
Victims of workplace discrimination went unprotected for years. It
was not until the civil rights activities in the early 1960s that Congress
passed Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.' The Act's passage was
historic because it was the first comprehensive federal law prohibiting
job discrimination on the basis of race, religion, national origin, and
sex.2 Title VII, however, did not cover age discrimination. Congress
first passed federal legislation addressing discrimination on the basis of
age in 1967.' This legislation was titled the Age Discrimination in Em-
ployment Act (ADEA).4
Despite the passage of the ADEA,
[niumerous obstacles to older worker employment persist in the workplace, in-
cluding negative stereotypes about aging and productivity; job demands and
schedule constraints that are incompatible with the skills and needs of older
1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988). The Title VII provides, "It shall be an unlaw-
ful employment practice for an employer ... to fail or refuse to hire or to dis-
charge ... or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." Id.
2. Id.
3. 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1988).
4. Id.
workers; and management policies that make it difficult to remain in the labor
force, such as early retirement incentives. '
One study concluded that eight out of ten Americans believe older
workers face age discrimination in the workplace.6 In fact, the older
population suffers from unemployment to a greater extent than its
younger counterparts.7
Age discrimination is problematic because it involves nuances and
ambiguities unlike other areas of employment discrimination.8 The
notable distinction between age and other bases for discrimination is
that with advanced age one's physical and mental capabilities are
invariably negatively affected? Unfortunately, many individuals who
do have a valid age discrimination case "fail to realize when they are
being discriminated against . . . [and] many do not understand their
rights and protections under the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act [ADEA]."'1
Under the hostile environment cause of action, an employer may
be liable for discriminatory harassment even if an employee does not
suffer economic harm." As long as the terms and conditions of the
employee's employment are affected by pervasive harassment, the
employee has an actionable claim.'" Thus, an employer may be re-
sponsible even where the employee was not discriminatorily fired or
denied a promotion and did not lose any wages or other economic
benefits because of the discrimination. 3
The hostile environment cause of action has .been applied to Title
VII discrimination, 4 but as yet has not been accepted in the age
discrimination arena.'" As this country's population grows older, soci-
ety cannot continue to ignore age discrimination. In light of all the
5. S. REP. No. 40(I), 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. 81 (1993), [hereinafter REPORT 40(1)].
6. Id. at 81-82 (citing nationwide surveys by Louis Harris & Associates conducted
in 1975 and 1981).
7. 29 U.S.C. § 621(a)(3) (1988) (noting that long-term unemployment is particularly
problematic among older workers, resulting in "deterioriation of skill, morale, and em-
ployer acceptability").
8. JOSEPH E. KALET, AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT LAw ix (2d ed. 1990).
9. Id.
10. S. REP. No. 249(1), 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 123 (1990) [hereinafter REPORT 249(1)].
The report goes on to cite a 1981 Louis Harris Survey that found "approximately half
of the older workers polled were unaware of their ADEA rights and protections." Id.
The Senate Report concluded that these statistics were unlikely to have changed in
the nine-year interim because of the lack of a "concerted awareness campaign." Id.
11. Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957
(1972).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. See infra notes 85-99.
15. See infra notes 146-70.
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attention paid to sexual harassment, the Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Commission (EEOC) "believes it important to reiterate and em-
phasize that harassment on any of the bases covered by the Federal
anti-discrimination statutes is unlawful."'6
This Comment examines the use of the hostile environment theo-
ry in age discrimination cases arising under the ADEA. Part II gives
an overview of the problem, focusing on the current definition of age
discrimination, who the real victims of age discrimination are, and
current statistics describing those affected.'7 Part III traces the devel-
opment of Title VII hostile environment theory as it was first applied
to national origin and then to sexual discrimination cases.8 Part IV
discusses the three federal court cases that have applied the hostile
environment theory to age discrimination, focusing on the underlying
rationale of each decision. 9 Part IV concludes that the language of
the ADEA, its legislative history, its similarities to Title VII, and the
proposed EEOC guidelines support the use of the hostile environment
analysis in ADEA cases.2 ° Part V then examines the impact of the
hostile environment theory on age discrimination cases, focusing on
the perspective of the plaintiff as well as the employer.2' Finally,
this Comment concludes by analyzing whether the theory will likely
be adopted and advocating that it should be.22 It is imperative to
have consistent and consolidated guidelines that apply to all types of
discrimination, not only to streamline discrimination cases and pro-
vide a reasonable basis upon which both plaintiffs and defendants
can rely, but also to send the message that age discrimination is just
as abhorrent as any other type of discrimination.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE PROBLEM
The courts have failed to adequately address age discrimination.
16. 58 Fed. Reg. 51266, 51267 (1993) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1609) (pro-
posed Oct. 1993). See generally Frank S. Ravitch, Beyond Reasonable Accommodation:
The Availability and Structure of a Cause of Action for Workplace Harassment Un-
der the Americans With Disabilities Act, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1475 (1994) (arguing
that a modified form of the hostile environment theory should apply to cases arising
under the Americans With Disabilities Act).
17. See infra notes 23-84 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 85-145 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 146-209 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 145-209 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 210-81 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 282-83 and accompanying text.
It remains neglected in a field where sex, race, national origin, and
religion have been given greater attention.' A 1990 Senate Report
indicated that discrimination on the basis of age negatively impacts
"the work efforts of older persons [by] encouraging premature labor
force withdrawal."24 From an economic standpoint, age discrimination
is harmful to society as a whole. It prevents millions of productive
older workers from contributing to the national economy and thereby
increases the draw on the federal treasury and social security.25
These problems will continue if effective solutions to age discrimina-
tion are not implemented.26
The largest growing segment of the population consists of people
over the age of forty years.27 Contrary to popular stereotypes, the
people protected by the ADEA are "steadily improving in terms of
overall competency, potentiality, and availability."28 In fact, people
23. In 1993 there were 17,491 age discrimination complaints filed with the EEOC.
Carolyn Magnuson, What they said: 'There's No Job.' What they meant: 'You're Too
Old!,' GOOD HOUSEKEEPING, Oct. 1994, at 137. Comparing this number with the 3097
age discrimination cases filed with the EEOC in 1979 makes apparent the overall
growth of this field. Karl R. Kunze, The Use of Effective Personnel Systems To Obvi-
ate Underutilization and Legal Problems of Older Workers: A Practical Guide For
Employers, in AGE DISCRIMINATION EMPLOYMENT ACT-A SYMPOSIUM HANDBOOK FOR
LAWYERS AND PERSONNEL PRACTITIONERS 297, 310 (1983). Approximately 20% of all
discrimination cases filed with the EEOC involve age. Magnuson, supra, at 242. How-
ever, of the 17,491 complaints, only 4% of these resulted in a finding of employer
violation. Id. As a spokeswoman for the EEOC explained, "Age cases are very diffi-
cult for the victim to prove." Id. The study described in Good Housekeeping involved
undercover old and young people with similar resumes applying for the same posi-
tion, the outcome being that the younger people got more job offers for better posi-
tions. Id. at 242, 244. The study also revealed a great amount of "'subtle discrimina-
tion at the application stage.'" Id.
24. REPORT 249(I), supra note 10, at 228. Age discrimination "increas[es] the draw
on Social Security and private pensions." Id.
25. EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 231 (1983) (holding that the Commerce
Clause power allowed Congress to apply the ADEA to state and local governments).
26. REPORT 249(I), supra note 10, at 228.
27. Where the Growth Will Be-State Population Projections: 1993 To 2020, U.S.
Census Bureau's Projections, Aug. 15, 1994, available in WESTLAW, CENDATA Data-
base. Not only will the elderly population increase from 13% to 16% of the total U.S.
population from the year 1993 to 2020, but the percentage of those persons under
age 20 will drop by 2%. Id. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, "one out of every
8 persons, or 31.2 million people, in the United States today is 65 years of age or
older." Housing for the Elderly is as Diverse as the Elderly Population, Census Bu-
reau Says, U.S. Census Bureau Press Release, Dec. 1, 1993, available in WESTLAW,
CENDATA Database.
28. Kunze, supra note 23, at 301.
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over forty years old benefit from improved health and longer life
expectancies, which result in the potential for an extended work life
and increased "education levels."29
A. Age Discrimination Defined
Prior to the ADEA, older workers had little protection from em-
ployment discrimination or discharge." Congress declared that "in
the face of rising productivity and affluence, older workers find
themselves disadvantaged in their efforts to retain employment, and
especially to regain employment when displaced from jobs."3 Thus,
the ADEA was born."2
The express purpose of the ADEA is to "promote employment of
older persons based on their ability rather than age. "' However, the
statute does not completely define or explain age discrimination. In
fact, the only thing the ADEA does say is that "it shall be unlaw-
ful . . . [to] discriminate against any individual . . . because of such
individual's age."' Thus there is no outright prohibition nor endorse-
ment of the hostile environment theory within the ADEA.
B. The Burdens of Proof and Persuasion
The standard test for employment discrimination was first estab-
lished in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green." The United States Su-
29. Id.
30. See id.
31. ADEA 29 U.S.C. § 621(a)(1)-(2) (1988). Congress lent support to this statement
by noting that "the setting of arbitrary age limits regardless of potential for job per-
formance had become a common practice." Id.
32. The ADEA applies to private employers with 20 or more workers; labor organi-
zations with 25 or more members or that operate a hiring hall or office which re-
cruits potential employees or obtains job opportunities; federal, state and local gov-
ernments; and employment agencies. 29 U.S.C. § 630(a)-(c), (e) (1988), § 633(a)
(1988).
33. 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1988).
34. Id. It also is unlawful "to limit, segregate, or classify . . . employees in any
way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportuni-
ties or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such
individual's age." 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2) (1988). Additionally, the ADEA prohibits em-
ployers from "reduc[ing] the wage rate of any employee in order to comply with this
chapter." 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(3) (1988).
35. 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); see also Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v.
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 260 (1981) (clarifying that the burden of persuasion remains
with the plaintiff at all times). McDonnell Douglas was a race discrimination case in
preme Court held that Title VII cases require that the plaintiff: (i) be
in the protected class; (ii) be qualified for the job; (iii) be rejected,
despite his qualifications; and (iv) after his rejection, show that "the
position remained open and the employer continued to seek appli-
cants from persons of complainant's qualifications. " '
In applying the McDonnell Douglas test to the ADEA, the plaintiff
must prove a prima facie case of age discrimination. He must first
demonstrate that he is within the protected age group.37 This re-
quirement is met fairly easily since the plaintiffs age is the touch-
stone determination. The plaintiff must then demonstrate, however,
that he or she is qualified for the position and was discharged or
otherwise discriminated against despite his or her qualifications.'
Finally, the plaintiff must provide evidence showing that the position
remained vacant and applications were sought from people with the
plaintiffs same qualifications.39
Once the plaintiff makes out his or her prima facie case, there is
an inference of discrimination." The burden of production then
shifts to the defendant, who must now express a legitimate, non-dis-
criminatory reason for the employment action.' If the defendant
fails to do so, the court must rule in favor of the employee." It is
important to note that the employer does not have to prove the
truth of its reason, but must only verbalize an explanation for its ac-
tions." The defendant must only raise "a genuine issue of fact as to
whether it discriminated against the plaintiff'" in order for the plain-
which the plaintiff alleged he was not rehired after his layoff because he was black.
411 U.S. at 794-96. The Court held that the employer successfully rebutted the
plaintiffs case by offering evidence that the employee had engaged in disruptive acts
against the employer and because of that was not rehired. Id. at 806-07. The Court
remanded the case because the plaintiff had not been given the opportunity to prove
that the employer's proffered explanation "was a pretext or discriminatory in its ap-
plication." Id. at 807.
36. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
37. Under the ADEA, the person must be over the age of 40. 29 U.S.C. § 631(a)
(1988 & Supp. 1995). Under most state legislation the person need only be over the
age of 18. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-66(a) (1986 & Supp. 1995), IOWA CODE
§ 216.6(1)(a), (3) (1994), N.Y. ExEc. LAw § 296 3-a (McKinney 1993), OR. REV. STAT.
§ 659.030(1)(a) (1989), VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21 § 495(a)(1), (c) (1987 & Supp. 1995).
38. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
39. Id.
40. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981) (citing
Furno Const. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978)).
41. Id.
42. Id.; see also St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2748, 2753-54
(1993) (affirming Texas Dep't of Community Affair's description of the sequence of
burdens in discrimination cases).
43. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs, 450 U.S. at 254-55.
44. Id. at 254. "Placing this burden of production on the defendant thus serves si-
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tiff to avoid summary judgment. Ultimately, the plaintiff still has the
burden of persuasion in making out his or her discrimination
claim."
If the defendant rebuts the plaintiff's prima facie case, the burden
of production shifts back to the employee to prove that the
defendant's reasons are a pretext or excuse for discrimination.46 Es-
sentially, the plaintiff at this point has both the burden of production
and the burden of persuading the trier of fact that he or she is a
victim of age discrimination.47 Ultimately, the factfinder must deter-
mine "'whether the rejection was discriminatory'" within the meaning
of the ADEA 8
In 1993, the third element of the McDonnell Douglas standard
was clarified. In Crady v. Liberty National Bank & Trust Co.,49 the
plaintiff failed to satisfy the third element of the McDonnell Douglas
test.' The plaintiff filed an age discrimination suit against his em-
ployer upon learning he was to be transferred to what he felt was a
less desirable position."' Because neither the employee's salary nor
benefits would be decreased under his new job, the court held that
he failed to show that his job transfer was a materially adverse
change in the terms and conditions of his employment.52 The court
multaneously to meet the plaintiffs prima facie case by presenting a legitimate reason
for the action and to frame the factual issue with sufficient clarity so that the plain-
tiff will have a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate pretext." Id. at 255-56.
45. Id. at 253.
46. For example, the plaintiff may show that his or her age was the true motiva-
tion behind the employer's decision or that the employer's proffered excuse is un-
trustworthy and unbelievable. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05
(1973); see Pollard v. Rea Magnet Wire Co., 824 F.2d 557, 559-61 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 977 (1987) ("A reason honestly described but poorly founded is not
a pretext, as that term is used in the law of discrimination."); Gray v. New England
Tel. & Tel. Co., 792 F.2d 251, 255 (1st Cir. 1986) (stating that it is insufficient to
show employer made an unwise business decision); see also St. Mary's Honor Ctr.,
113 S. Ct. at 2752 (clarifying that a "reason cannot be proved to be 'a pretext for
discrimination' unless it is shown both that the reason was false, and that discrimi-
nation was the real reason").
47. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs, 450 U.S. at 256.
48. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 113 S. Ct. at 2753 (quoting United States Postal Serv.
Bd. v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 714-15 (1983).
49. 993 F.2d 132 (7th Cir. 1993).
50. Id. at 135.
51. Id. at 133-34.
52. Id. at 135-36.
explained that materially adverse means more than "mere inconve-
nience or an alteration of job responsibilities."'
Even though the McDonnell Douglas test is critical in discrimina-
tion cases, the courts have "repeatedly held that age discrimination
suits should be decided on a case by case basis, and that rigid ad-
herence to McDonnell Douglas should be discouraged."' This is es-
pecially true where the plaintiff offers direct evidence of discrimina-
tion, and does not rely on circumstantial evidence.5
C. Recent Developments Regarding the ADEA
While the McDonnell Douglas test is an essential tool in employ-
ment discrimination actions, it is not the sole test for liability. In
1989, the United States Supreme Court, in Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins,' established an alternative test to be used for "mixed mo-
tive" cases. 7 The plaintiff in this case alleged that the reason her
employer failed to promote her was because of gender animus.' The
employer defended the charge, however, by offering legitimate con-
cerns as to the woman's "interpersonal skills."' The Court held that
where the employer's decision was a result of such "mixed motives"
the plaintiff must first prove that an illegitimate reason was one of
the "motivating" factors.' If the plaintiff satisfies this element then
the burden shifts to the employer to prove it "would have made such
a decision even if [it] had not taken the plaintiffs gender into ac-
count."6
53. Id. at 136. The court listed examples of what would constitute a materially ad-
verse change in employment conditions, including: "termination of employment, a
demotion evidenced by a decrease in wage or salary, a less distinguished title, a
material loss of benefits, significantly diminished material responsibilities, or other
indices that might be unique to a particular situation." Id.
54. McDonald v. Union Camp Corp., 898 F.2d 1155, 1161 (6th Cir. 1990).
55. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985). Where direct
evidence is offered by the plaintiff, the employer loses unless he proves an affirma-
tive defense. Id.; see also Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
56. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
57. Id. Mixed motive means that the employer's decision regarding the employee
was a mixture of legitimate and illegitimate motives. Id. at 246-47.
58. Id. at 232.
59. Id. at 236.
60. Id. at 258. The Court found that the employer's decision was primarily a result
of the employee's gender. Id.
61. Id. The standard of proof for the defendant employer is the preponderance of
the evidence standard, not the clear and convincing standard used by the Court of
Appeals. Id.
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Four years later, in Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins,62 the Court
clarified the standard of willfulness required for a valid ADEA claim.
According to the Supreme Court, the employer must have known "or
showed reckless disregard for the matter of whether" conduct violat-
ed an anti-discrimination statute.' The case reaffirmed the Court's
1985 decision in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston' where the
Court found that the employer acted in good faith in trying to deter-
mine if its transfer plan violated the ADEA.'
Just as the courts have expanded the field of age discrimination,
there has been a corresponding growth in the ADEA as well.' Addi-
tionally, as a supplement to this federal legislation, "most of the fifty
states have enacted state anti-discrimination laws which also govern
employment discrimination."67
D. The Victims
Older workers face a variety of forms of age discrimination, in-
cluding termination, refusal to hire, early retirement packages, re-as-
signment to a less desirable location, and receiving poor evaluations
to justify a later dismissal.'
One of the reasons behind this employer discrimination is the
misperception that older workers are less efficient than younger
ones.' This belief relies in part on the fact that younger workers
62. 113 S. Ct. 1701 (1993). The facts of Hazen Paper Co. involve the impact of the
ADEA upon an employer who fired his "older" employee to prevent the employee's
pension benefits from vesting. Id. at 1704-05. The Court held that such employer
action would not violate the ADEA. Id. at 1707.
63. Id. at 1710. In Hazen Paper Co., the plaintiff benefitted by not having to prove
that the employer's conduct was "outrageous" or offer any direct evidence of the
motivation behind the employer's actions or prove that the plaintiffs age was the
"predominant factor" behind the employer's actions. Id.
64. 469 U.S. 111 (1985). This case defined and limited the standard later reiterated
in Hazen Paper Co. Id. The Court held that an employer's knowledge of only "the
potential applicability of the ADEA" did not constitute "willfulness." Id.
65. Id. at 129.
66. See infra notes 188-90 and accompanying text.
67. Ira A- Turret, Age Discrimination In Employment: Recent Trends and Devel-
opments, in SECURITIEs ARBITRAON 349 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook
Series No. B4-7036, 1993); see, e.g., Amz REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1463 (1994); FLA. STAT.
ch. 112.044(1)-(2) (1994); N.Y. ExEC. LAw § 296 (McKinney 1994).
68. REPORT 40(1), supra note 5, at 82.
69. Id.
are instructed in new technology."0 Employers often rationalize this
phenomenon by convincing themselves it is economically inefficient to
retrain an older employee.7'
Older workers, however, have been found to be as productive as
younger workers.72 In fact, in a 1989 American Association of Re-
tired Persons poll of 400 companies, many employers stated that
"older workers generally are regarded very positively and are valued
for their experience, knowledge, work habits and attitudes . . .pro-
ductivity, attendance, commitment to quality, and work perfor-
mance."73 Unfortunately, this sentiment is not universal and many
older people are pushed out of the workplace.
A recent study of people over fifty-five years of age found that
almost 5.4 million older Americans felt willing and able to work but
did not have a job.7 4 In light of this information, it is interesting to
note the results of a 1981 survey that found that while most em-
ployers felt their company was devoid of age discrimination, "more
than half believe[d] older workers are discriminated against in the
employment market, presumably by other firms." 5
70. Id.
71. Id. Actually, Bureau of Labor statistics indicate that the current employee's
median job tenure is "as little as 4.2 years." Id. This statistic does not corroborate
employers' fear, rather it, disproves them. Id. Thus, it does not appear a younger
worker will stay at a job any longer than an older one.
72. Charles H. Edwards & Stephen R. McConnell, The Future of the ADEA: Pres-
sure Builds to Abolish Mandatory Retirement, in AGE DISCRIMINATION EMPLOYMENT
ACT-A SYMPOSIUM HANDBOOK FOR LAWYERS AND PERSONNEL PRACTITIONERS 384, 394
(1983). Older workers "have lower absenteeism, higher reliability and, in many cases,
better decision-making ability." Id.
73. REPORT 40(I), supra note 5, at 83. A 1985 study found that "although chrono-
logical age may be a convenient means for estimating performance potential, it falls
short in accounting for the wide range of individual differences in job performance
for people at various ages." Id.
74. Untapped Resource: [Tihe Final Report of the Americans over 55 At Work
Program, Commonwealth Fund, 1993, available in WESTLAW, AGELINE Database
(results of a five-year study). Another study found that, in the future, workers over
age 55 will probably want to work longer but may "face barriers similar to those
currently experienced by older workers." Id.
75. Edwards & McConnell, supra note 72, at 392 (citing a 1981 survey of employ-
ers by William M. Mercer, Inc.). Specifically, the 1981 Mercer study found that
61% of employers believe older workers are discriminated against on the
basis of age; 22% claim it is unlikely that without negative legal consequences
a company would hire someone over age 50 for a position other than senior
management; 20% admit that older workers, other than senior executives,
have less opportunity for promotions or training; and 12% admit that older
workers' pay raises are not as large as those of younger workers in the
same category.
REPORT 40(l), supra note 5, at 82.
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Even though the parties involved in age discrimination cases are
increasingly relying on such statistics, "there are some possible differ-
ences in the use of statistics in age cases as a result of the natural
aging process."" This may be one explanation why less attention has
been paid to age discrimination than to Title VII cases.77 A report
prepared by the Secretary of Labor and confirmed by the Executive
and Legislative branches has even conceded that age discrimination
"rarely [is] based on the sort of animus motivating some other forms
of discrimination. "78 Yet, the report hastened to add that age discrim-
ination is "based in large part on stereotypes unsupported by objec-
tive fact."
79
In fact, the victims of age discrimination seem to have much in
common with their Title VII counterparts. Research supports the con-
cept that sexual harassment "sends a message of inferiority and
objectification directed against individual women and women as a
class."' These messages undoubtedly affect a person's performance.
at work. It seems logical that victims of age discrimination would
suffer similar effects.
There are numerous costs associated with leaving a job. Aside
from the employee's loss of income and seniority, he or she has a
"disrupted work history, problems with obtaining references for future
jobs, loss of confidence in seeking a new job, and loss of career ad-
76. Arthur E. Joyce, Defense of Age Discrimination in Employment Act Charges
Relating to Promotion Issues, in AGE DISCRIMINATION EMPLOYMENT ACT-A SYMPOSIUM
HANDBOOK FOR LAWYERS AND PERSONNEL PRACTITIONERS 285, 292 (1983).
77. While the number of discrimination complaints doubled over the past five
years, the number of age discrimination cases continues to be low compared to Title
VII cases. Ann Grimes, The Federal Page Inside: EEOC-Reinvigorating the Fight
Against Discrimination, WASH. POST, Oct. 27, 1994, at A21. From 1993 to 1994, the
increase of disability cases filed was 27% (due in large part to the recent passage of
the Americans with Disabilities Act), retaliation cases rose 14%, sex cases went up
5%, religion was up 3%, equal pay claims rose by 2%, national origin saw a decrease
of 3%, race also decreased by 4%, and age rounded out the claims with an overall
decrease of 6%. Id.
78. EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 230-31 (1983).
79. Id. at 231.
80. Jane L Dolkart, Hostile Environment Harassment: Equality, Objectivity, and
the Shaping of Legal Standards, 43 EMORY L.J. 151, 187 (1994). In one study of 92
women, 66% of victims of sexual harassment left their job, either voluntarily or invol-
untarily, because of sexual harassment. Id. (citing PEGGY CRuLL, THE IMPACT OF SEXU-
AL HARASSMENT ON THE JOB: A PROFILE OF THE EXPERIENCES OF 92 WOMEN (1979)).
Forty-two percent of the women left their job in order to escape the emotionally
harming harassment. Id. (citing CRULL, supra).
vancement."8' This is especially true for older individuals who in-
vested a great amount of time and energy in their jobs. Older work-
ers also face longer bouts of unemployment than younger workers
and thus "are more likely to exhaust available unemployment insur-
ance benefits and suffer economic hardships. This is especially true
because many persons over 45 still have significant financial obliga-
tions."' In addition to the monetary costs associated with unemploy-
ment, there are also psychological and physical side effects in-
volved.' This is not to mention the costs that employees who re-
main at their job endure. Certainly the working conditions are hostile
and unpleasant for the victim employee, but he or she also has little
chance to advance in his or her career.8
Age discrimination exists on a widespread scale. While the ADEA
offers some protections and case law has expanded these protections,
many victims of age discrimination are left without sufficient legal re-
course.
III. THE EVOLUTION OF THE HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT THEORY AS
IT WAS FIRST APPLIED TO NATIONAL ORIGIN AND
THEN TO SEXUAL DISCRIMINATION
A. Rogers v. EEOC
Rogers v. EEOC"5 first recognized a cause of action based upon
a discriminatory work environment. This Fifth Circuit case held that
an employer's segregation of his Hispanic clientele could constitute
an offensive work environment to a Hispanic employee.' The court
reasoned that the language "terms, conditions, or privileges of em-
ployment"87 of Title VII "is an expansive concept" that envelops "a
working environment heavily charged with ethnic or racial discrim-
ination."'
81. Dolkart, supra note 80, at 187 (citing Jean A. Hamilton, Emotional Conse-
quences of Victimization and Discrimination in "Special Populations" of Women, 12
PSYCHIATRIC CLINIC N. AM. 35, 161 (1989)).
82. REPORT 40(1), supra note 5, at 82-83.
83. Id. For example, an older worker may suffer serious stress, "including hope-
lessness, depression, and frustration . . . [and] medical evidence suggests that forced
retirement can so adversely affect a person's physical, emotional, and psychological
health that a lifespan may be shortened." Id. In addition, these employees may "not
feel welcome as credible colleagues, may feel excluded or segregated, or may lose
confidence in themselves as workers. Those in supervisory positions may feel under-
mined as managers." Dolkart, sipra note 80, at 188 (citations omitted).
84. Dolkart, supra note 80, at 188.
85. 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972).
86. Id. at 239.
87. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1988).
88. Rogers, 454 F.2d at 238.
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Because of the ever-increasing complexities of employment dis-
crimination, the court asserted that it was proper to protect not only
an employee's economic interests, but also his psychological well-
being.' The court's vivid description of a "working environment[] so
heavily polluted with discrimination as to destroy completely the
emotional and psychological stability of minority group workers " ' is
clearly encompassed under Title VII. Judge Goldberg did caution the
use of the hostile environment though, stating that "an employer's
mere utterance of an ethnic or racial epithet which engenders offen-
sive feelings in an employee" would not fall under the boundaries of
section 703 of Title VII.9'
Courts have since uniformly applied this theory to discrimination
cases based on race," religion,' national origin," sex," and most
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. See Firefighters Inst. for Racial Equality v. City of St. Louis, 549 F.2d 506 (8th
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 819 (1977); Gray v. Greyhound Lines, E., 545 F.2d
169 (D.C. Cir. 1976). Firefighters Inst. for Racial Equality involved black firefighters
who were excluded from the informal dining area of the firehouse. 549 F.2d at 514.
This area was known as a "supper club" and consisted of kitchen appliances, utensils
and food. Id. Although the supper clubs were not regulated by the fire department,
the court reasoned that the excluded black firefighters were subjected to an offensive
environment that the fire department could correct. Id. Since the supper clubs used
city property, the fire department must require the inclusion of black firefighters in
order to facilitate a "nondiscriminatory working environment." Id. at 515.
In the Gray case, the court found that a black employee would have a viable
claim against the defendant company if he had indeed suffered "the effects of
Greyhound's [the defendant] allegedly discriminatory hiring policies on his treatment
at work and on his own psychological well-being," as he alleged. 545 F.2d at 173,
176. If the plaintiff experienced a hostile work environment, that is clearly encom-
passed under Title VII's "protection against discrimination in the 'terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment.'" Id. at 176 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(2)).
93. Compston v. Borden, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 157 (S.D. Ohio 1976). Shortly after the
plaintiffs supervisor learned of his religious affiliation, the supervisor verbally abused
him. Id. at 158. The court reasoned that such intentional conduct would "necessarily
have the effect of altering the conditions of his [the plaintiff's] employment." Id. at
160-61.
94. Cariddi v. Kansas City Chiefs Football Club, Inc., 568 F.2d 87, 88 (8th Cir.
1977). In this case, the plaintiff, of Italian-American descent, alleged that he suffered
numerous ethnic slurs while employed by the defendant. Id. The Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit recognized that "derogatory comments could be so excessive and
opprobrious as to constitute an unlawful employment practice under Title VII." Id.
The court went on to state that the comments in this case were not indicative of a
hostile environment, but rather that they were part of casual conversation. Id.
95. See Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (lth Cir. 1982); Bundy v. Jack-
recently to Title IX cases.96 From these cases, the EEOC proposed
guidelines in 1980 recognizing the hostile environment for sexual
harassment. 7 These guidelines list examples of what constitutes sex-
ual harassment, assuming the conduct "has the purpose or effect of
unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance or
creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment."
Such conduct includes "[u]nwelcome sexual advances, requests for
sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual na-
ture."'
B. Meritor Savings Bank, FSB. v. Vinson"6
The United States Supreme Court officially adopted the use of
the hostile environment cause of action for Title VII cases in Menitor
Savings Bank, FSB. v. Vinson.'° A female bank employee charged
her employer with sexual discrimination, claiming her supervisor fon-
died and raped her at work and exposed himself to her on numerous
occasions."' The woman failed to report these occurrences to any-
one at the company because of her fear of the supervisor. 3 When
she was later fired for abusing sick leave, she brought this action,
son, 641 F.2d 934, 943-44 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (holding that hostile environment "follows
ineluctably from numerous cases finding Title VII violations where an employer creat-
ed or condoned a substantially (racially) discriminatory work environment, regardless
of whether the complaining employees lost any tangible job benefits") (citing Rogers
v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972).
96. See Doe v. Petaluma City School Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1560, 1563 (N.D. Cal.
1993) (approving the hostile environment theory for Title IX cases). "Title IX of the
Educational Amendments Act of 1972 [20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1988)], prohibits sexual
discrimination by any federally-assisted educational program." Stacey R. Rinestine,
Terrorism on the Playground: What Can Be Done, 32 DuQ. L. REV. 799 (1994); see
also Office for Civil Rights, 59 Fed. Reg. 11448 (1994) (including the hostile environ-
ment theory in Department of Education Guidelines for compliance with Title VII);
Gal Sorenson, Peer Sexual Harassment: Remedies and Guidelines Under Federal
Law, 92 EDUc. L. REP. (West) 1 (1994) (discussing Title IX violations and remedies in
terms of a hostile environment).
97. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1980). The guidelines also apply to race, color, religion,
and national origin, codifying the hostile environment theory for all Title VII issues.
Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. "Sexual harassment which creates a hostile or offensive environment for
members of one sex is every bit the arbitrary barrier to sexual equality at the
workplace that racial harassment is to racial equality." Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d
897, 902 (11th Cir. 1982).
100. 477 U.S. 57, 73 (1986).
101. Id. at 73.
102. Id. at 60.
103. Id. at 61.
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alleging that she was subjected to a hostile work environment during
her employment."
The Court held that Title VII permits recovery for victims of
sexual discrnination where the discrimination "created a hostile or
abusive work environment."'0 ' As support for its holding, the Court
emphasized that the EEOC and many judicial decisions had found
that there existed a "right to work in an environment free from dis-
criminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult."' In addition to citing
the specific language of Title VII, Justice Rehnquist pointed to the
1980 EEOC guidelines that approved the use of the hostile environ-
ment theory for sexual harassment.' 7 Justice Rehnquist noted that
although the guidelines were not controlling upon the Court, they do
in fact "constitute ,a body of experience and informed judgment to
which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance."'" The
fact that the Supreme Court so highly valued the EEOC's 1980 guide-
lines regarding sexual harassment implies the possibility that the
newest proposed guidelines calling for the application of the hostile
environment to age discrimination will also be duly acknowledged.
However, Meritor Savings failed to address two questions, which
were later addressed in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc."° These
questions involved what legal standard to apply to determine if a
hostile environment existed, and what the necessary level of psycho-
logical injury is that a complainant must suffer in order to make a
claim.110
C. Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.
In Harris, the plaintiff quit her job and then filed suit against
her employer, Forklift Systems."' She alleged that her employer
taunted and insulted her because she was female and made her the
object of sexual innuendoes."2
104. Id. at 60.
105. Id. at 66.
106. Id. at 65.
107. Id. at 64-65; see supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
108. Id. at 65 (quoting General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 142 (1976)).
109. 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993).
110. Id. at 369.
111. Id.
112. Id.
Prior to Harris, there had been conflict among the circuits as to
whether a psychological injury was necessary for a hostile work
environment claim."3 The Harris court declined to find that any of-
fensive conduct would be actionable under Title VII or that a Title
VII claim must be based on conduct that resulted in tangible psycho-
logical injury."4 Rather, the Court adopted a middle ground."5
The Court explained that a hostile environment may exist where
discrimination affects an employee's performance at work, hampers
the employee in advancing at work, or discourages the employee
from staying at work."6 Psychological injury, while relevant in ascer-
taining the plaintiffs subjective perceptions of her environment, can-
not be the touchstone for finding employer liability.
1 7
The plaintiff in Harris urged the Court to adopt the reasonable
woman test.' The Court compromised by holding that the standard
set out in Meritor required an objectively hostile or abusive environ-
ment as well as the victim's subjective perception that the environ-
ment was abusive."9 The reasonable person, therefore, must find the
environment "hostile" and the victim must have actually perceived it
to be so.'2
"[Wihether an environment is 'hostile' or 'abusive' can be deter-
mined only by looking at of all the circumstances.' 2' This includes
the severity of the conduct, "whether it is physically threatening or
humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreason-
ably interferes with an employee's work performance."'22 One must
113. Id. at 370.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 371.
117. Id.
118. Id. For information regarding the advantages and disadvantages of the reason-
able woman standard, see Robert S. Adler & Ellen R. Pierce, The Legal, Ethical, and
Social Implications of the "Reasonable Woman" Standard in Sexual Harassment
Cases, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 773 (1993); Jolynn Childers, Is There a Place For a Rea-
sonable Woman in the Law? A Discussion of Recent Developments in Hostile Envi-
ronment Sexual Harassment, 42 DuKE L.J. 854 (1993); Robert Unikel, "Reasonable"
Doubts: A Critique of the Reasonable Woman Standard in American Jurisprudence,
87 Nw. U.L. REV. 326 (1992).
119. Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 371.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. Justice Scalia's concurring opinion criticized the majority for failing to pro-
vide a clearer standard and thereby letting juries make "unguided" decisions. Id. at
372 (Scalia, J., concurring). Yet Justice Scalia himself "know[s] of no alternative" to
the majority rule. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Ginsburg also concurred, al-
though she stated, "It suffices to prove that a reasonable person subjected to the dis-
criminatory conduct would find, as the plaintiff did, that the harassment so altered
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also consider "the frequency of the discriminatory conduct" in assess-
ing the totality of the circumstances.13 As the 1993 EEOC proposed
guidelines state, "Courts do not typically find violations based on
isolated or sporadic use of verbal slurs or epithets; nevertheless, they
recognize that an isolated instance of such conduct-particularly
when perpetrated by a supervisor-can corrode the entire employ-
ment relationship and create a hostile environment."'24
While both Meritor Savings and Harris addressed the hostile
environment cause of action, there was still no definitive answer as
to when an employer would be responsible for his or her
supervisor's discriminatory actions. Kotcher v. Rosa & Sullivan Appli-
ance Center, Inc.' finally offered some guidance.
D. Kotcher v. Rosa & Sullivan Appliance Center, Inc.
The plaintiff in Kotcher filed a sexual harassment claim against
her manager.2 ' The district court found that the plaintiff had indeed
been subjected to a hostile work environment,'27 yet did not impute
any liability to the manager's employer, Rosa and Sullivan.'2" The
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, however, found the
circumstances sufficient to impute liability. 9 The appellate court
held that the plaintiff must first prove that the conditions of her
employment were tainted by her supervisor to the extent that she en-
dured an offensive work environment."n Once the plaintiff has satis-
working conditions as to 'ma[k]e it more difficult to do the job.'" Id. (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring) (quoting Davis v. Monsanto Chem. Co., 858 F.2d 345, 349 (6th Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1110 (1989)).
123. Id. at 371.
124. 58 Fed. Reg. 51267 (1993) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1609).
125. 957 F.2d 59 (2d Cir. 1992).
126. Id. at 61.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 61-62.
129. Id. at 65.
130. Id. at 62.
[T]hough she [the plaintiff] need not show that she lost any tangible job ben-
efits ... [a] court should consider the offensiveness of the defendant's con-
duct, its pervasiveness, and its continuous nature . . . .The incidents must
be repeated and continuous; isolated acts or occasional episodes will not
merit relief. The conduct complained of must be unwelcome. Ultimately,
whether there is a valid claim under Title VII depends on the totality of the
circumstances.
Id. at 62-63 (citations omitted); see also Carrero v. New York City Hous. Auth., 890
fled this element, she must then attempt to impute the liability of
her supervisor to her employer.'3'
The court detailed two instances when an employer will be liable
to its employee for creating a hostile environment: (1) where the em-
ployer lacks an internal complaint mechanism, or (2) where the em-
ployer has knowledge of the harassment, but fails to take any action
regarding the harassment. 2  The Meritor Savings court first ad-
dressed the issue of employer liability but failed to outline exactly
when an employer would be held liable for his or her supervisor's
actions." The court in Kotcher reiterated and explained the factors
mentioned above, which are based on "traditional agency princi-
ples.""
The lower district court in Kotcher felt that the second element
[of employer liability] was not met because Rosa and Sullivan had
current procedures for handling reports of discrimination and actually
responded quickly to the plaintiffs complaint. "' The court concluded
that this was satisfactory evidence of Rosa and Sullivan's commit-
ment to a discrimination-free work environment.' Yet, the plaintiff
successfully argued on appeal that the company's response to her
F.2d 569, 577-78 (2d Cir. 1989) (finding that a sexual hostile environment exists even
where the female employee is not subjected to "an extended period of demeaning and
degrading provocation"); Snell v. Suffolk County, 782 F.2d 1094, 1103 (2d Cir. 1986)
(holding the defendant employer liable for failing to rectify a racially hostile work
environment).
131. Kotcher, 957 F.2d at 62-63.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 63.
134. Id.; see Meritor Savings, 477 U.S. at 72. Section 1609.2(a) (ii) of the EEOC
proposed guidelines calls for an employer to be liable "regardless of whether the em-
ployer knew or should have known of the conduct, if the harassing supervisory em-
ployee is acting in an 'agency capacity.'" 58 Fed. Reg. at 51,268 (to be codified at 29
C.F.R. § 1609). The Commission will assess the totality of the circumstances and the
job functions in determining whether the harasser was acting in an agency capacity.
Id. It is wise for an employer to have a system in place to address harassment com-
plaints. If the company does not have a specific policy against harassment in place,
then an employee "could reasonably believe that a harassing supervisor's actions will
be ignored, tolerated, or even condoned by the employer." Id. Note that an employer
may even be liable for the actions of nonsupervisory employees where he or she was
"aware or should have been aware of the harassing conduct." Id. Under proposed
§ 1609.2(c), employer responsibility would extend even to non-employee actions. Id.
Once again, it is where the employer "knew or should have known of the conduct
and failed to take immediate and appropriate corrective action, as feasible." Id. at
51,269.
135. Kotcher, 957 F.2d at 63.
136. Id. Ultimately, the U.S. Court of Appeals remanded the case for further consid-
eration.
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complaint was, in essence, a sham.'37 Rosa and Sullivan transferred
the supervisor to another store,"a but transferred him back and ac-
tually promoted the supervisor when the plaintiff left the compa-
ny. 39
In evaluating the lower court's decision, the Court of Appeals
acknowledged that "not every response to a complaint should take
the form of discharge."'4 ° Thus, the written warning Rosa and
Sullivan gave the supervisor in question in response to a previous
allegation by another employee of sexual harassment was not enough
to hold Rosa and Sullivan liable.'
The plaintiff next argued that the company had constructive no-
tice of the supervisor's misbehavior. A number of individuals in 'the
company knew of the harassment incidents.' The supervisor him-
self, the plaintiff argued, performed a managerial role and the compa-
ny thus should be held liable under agency law. 43 In response, the
court conceded that in some circumstances the supervisor may be at
such a high level within the company that the company would be
automatically liable for that supervisor's actions.'" This, however,
was not the case in Kotcher
45
Over time, the hostile environment has been fleshed out and has
taken on the character of a workable cause of action for many vic-
tims of workplace discrimination. The next natural step is to carry
this cause of action over to the area of age discrimination.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 164. The plaintiff further alleged that the company took "the risk that he
might harass others at his new location." Id.
139. Id. The court remanded this claim to the district court to be "evaluated in
light of all the circumstances, including the cloud of suspicion created by Trageser's
prompt restoration to his original position, a circumstance tending to indicate that
Rosa and Sullivan at least tolerated his unlawful harassing conduct." Id.
140. Id. at 63.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 64.
143. Id. The 1993 EEOC guidelines state that while "[a] written or verbal grievance
or complaint, or a charge filed with the EEOC provides actual notice ... [elvidence
that the harassment is pervasive may establish constructive knowledge." 58 Fed. Reg.
51,268 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1609.2(a)(i)).
144. Kotcher, 957 F.2d at 64.
145. Id. The appeals court held that in this case the lower court "could reasonably
have found that the company, whose main office was in Rochester, did not have con-
structive notice of Trageser's [the supervisor] behavior in Oswego." Id.
IV. SYNTHESIS OF TITLE VII HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT THEORY AND
AGE DISCRIMINATION CASES
A. How the Hostile Environment Theory Has Been Applied to
Cases Arising Under the ADEA
Drez v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc.46 was the first age discrimina-
tion case to adopt the hostile environment theory.'47 The Drez jury
found that the plaintiff, who was still employed by the defendant
company, had not been discriminated against because of his age.4 '
The jury also found, however, that the company had retaliated
against the plaintiff for having filed a charge with the EEOC.49 The
district court, in determining the validity of the defendant's motion
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, found that there was suffi-
cient evidence to support the jury's finding of company retaliation.'
The court summarized the holding of Meritor Savings and concluded,
"There is no sound reason why this court should interpret identical
statutory language [between the ADEA and Title VII] in the context
of age discrimination any differently." 5'
While Drez was the first case to accept a hostile environment
theory in the context of age discrimination, the case hardly took
hold of the country. In fact, it was not until six years later that
another case, Spence v. Maryland Casualty Co., utilized the theo-
ry.
A thirty-five-year employee, the plaintiff in Spence had a good
work record with the defendant company until a new supervisor was
appointed.' For the next year and a half, the fifty-eight-year-old
plaintiff received so much criticism and threats of being fired that
his health suffered and he eventually felt compelled to resign."
During the time leading up to his resignation, the plaintiff did not re-
ceive a salary increase or a bonus and was subjected to snide re-
marks about his old age."
The court affirmed the lower court's ruling that the company was
not liable to the plaintiff for a hostile work environment."' Although
the plaintiff demonstrated an abusive work environment, the court
146. 674 F. Supp. 1432 (D. Kan. 1987).
147. Id. at 1434.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1436-37.
151. Id. at 1436.
152. 995 F.2d 1147 (2d Cir. 1993).
153. Id. at 1149.
154. Id. at 1149-54.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1155.
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found that he failed to prove the second factor of the hostile envi-
ronment theory set out in Kotcher.17 The company had actually in-
vestigated the two supervisors at issue and demoted them in re-
sponse to complaints by another branch office not associated with
the plaintiff.
While Spence recognized the hostile environment theory for age
discrimination cases, it failed to offer much guidance for future deci-
sions. It was not until 1994, when Eggleston v. South Bend Commu-
nity School Corp.' was decided, that a detailed, comprehensive
case emerged and adopted the hostile environment theory for cases
arising under the ADEA.
The plaintiff in Eggleston initially filed a complaint with the
EEOC in 1988 for a school's failure to give him a teaching position
because of his age.' ° A conciliation agreement was later reached
between the parties and the plaintiff was rehired. 6' The plaintiff
next filed a charge in 1992 that the school had "subjected him to a
continuing pattern of harassment and intimidation" because of his
1988 charge against the school.'62 It is this 1992 charge on which
the Eggleston case rested. The court found that the school had in-
deed subjected the plaintiff to a hostile environment. In making
this determination, the court relied on the EEOC guidelines for the
criteria of what constitutes an abusive environment. Quoting the
EEOC, the court stated that "the standard is whether a reasonable
person in the same or similar circumstances would find the chal-
lenged conduct intimidating, hostile, or abusive.""
157. Id. As mentioned previously, the second element of the Kotcher test involves
imputing a supervisor's actions to the employer. To be successful, the plaintiff must
show that the employer lacked an internal complaint system or knew of the discrimi-
nation and failed to take any action about it. See supra note 134 and accompanying
text.
158. Id. at 1153.
159. 858 F. Supp. 841 (N.D. Ind. 1994).
160. Id. at 843. The plaintiff was already employed at the school as a football
coach. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. The plaintiff claimed that a school board member said, "It will be a cold
day in hell before I would recommend [the plaintiff] to be a coach in our system."
Id. at 848.
163. Id. at 849.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 849-50. It is worth noting that the standard enunciated by the EEOC in
its proposed guidelines seems in contravention with Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.,
In attacking the plaintiffs prima facie case of age discrimination,
the defendants contended that there was no adverse action by the
employer.'" The defendants pointed out that the plaintiff did not
lose his job and that, in fact, "'a materially adverse change in the
terms and conditions of employment must be more disruptive than a
mere inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities."'' 67 How-
ever, the Eggleston court noted there is "nothing in the Act [ADEA]
to suggest that Congress contemplated the limitation urged here [by
the defendant employer]. " "
In finding the hostile environment theory viable under the ADEA,
the court also relied on the fact that the Supreme Court has in the
past noted the similarities between Title VII language and the
ADEA.' As further support, Judge Sharp stated that the ADEA
"'does not limit its reach only to acts of retaliation that take the
form of cognizable employment actions such as discharge, transfer or
demotion.'"'70
in which the U.S. Supreme Court adopted a two-tiered objective/subjective standard.
See infra notes 228-31 and accompanying text (explaining Harris).
166. Id. at 845. This is the second element of the four-part test set forth in
McDonnell Douglas. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
167. Id. (quoting Crady v. Liberty Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 993 F.2d 132, 135 (7th
Cir. 1993)). The court further outlined a number of things it would consider a "mate-
rially adverse change." Id.
168. Id. at 846. The court specifically credited the 1980 EEOC guidelines regarding
sexual harassment with a great amount of weight because they were consistent with
existing case law. Id.; see Cariddi v. Kansas City Chiefs Football Club, Inc., 568 F.2d
87 (8th Cir. 1977) (national origin claim may be based on hostile environment);
Firefighters Inst. for Racial Equality v. St. Louis, 549 F.2d 506 (8th Cir.) (hostile envi-
ronment for discrimination based on race), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 819 (1977); Gray v.
Greyhound Lines, East, 545 F.2d 169 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (hostile environment for racial
discrimination); Compston v. Borden, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 157 (S.D. Ohio 1976) (reli-
gious discrimination cases and the hostile environment). The 1993 EEOC guidelines,
since withdrawn, also rely on case law with regard to the hostile environment cases
involving age discrimination. The court quotes the EEOC's proposed regulation:
For more than 20 years, the federal courts have held that harassment violates
the statutory prohibition against discrimination in the terms and conditions of
employment. The Commission has held and continues to hold that an em-
ployer has a duty to maintain a working environment free of harassment
based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, or disability, and that
the duty requires positive action where necessary to eliminate such practices
or remedy their effects.
Eggleston, 858 F. Supp. at 848.
169. Eggleston, 858 F. Supp. at 847; see Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584 (1978)
(noting similarities between Title VII and the ADEA).
170. Eggleston, 858 F. Supp. at 847 (quoting Passer v. American Chem. Soc'y, 935
F.2d 322, 331 (D.C. Cir. 1991)).
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B. The Distinction Between Constructive Discharge and the
Hostile Environment Theory as Applied to Age Discrimination
in ADEA Cases
The difference between the hostile environment cause of action
and the common-law notion of constructive discharge is that in con-
structive discharge cases the plaintiff is forced to resign. 7' The test
of whether there has been a constructive discharge'72 is not "wheth-
er the employee's working conditions were difficult or unpleasant."'73
Rather, the conditions of employment must be such that a
"reasonable person in the employee's shoes would have felt com-
pelled to resign."'74
Conversely, with the hostile environment theory, the plaintiff may
bring a charge while he or she is still on the job.'75 The employee
who feels compelled to quit because the working conditions are so
intolerable does not have to quit under a hostile environment cause
of action.' Thus, the adoption of the hostile environment theory to
age discrimination cases will broaden and expand the options open
to victim employees. No longer must employees quit or wait to be
fired in order to file a claim with the EEOC.
171. See Pena v. Brattleboro Retreat, 702 F.2d 322, 325 (2d Cir. 1983) (quoting
Young v. Southwestern Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 509 F.2d 140, 144 (5th Cir. 1975)).
172. This test pertains to the first element in McDonnell Douglas, which requires
the plaintiff in a constructive discharge case to prove a prima facie case before the
burden is shifted to the employer. See generally Turner v. Anheuser-Busch Inc., 7 Cal.
4th 1238 (1994) (redefining the standard of proof for constructive discharge cases in
California as requiring the employer to have actual knowledge of the employment
conditions at issue). Obviously this test is a much harsher standard than the hostile
environment cause of action proposed by the EEOC. In fact, the exact standard re-
quired in constructive discharge cases varies. See William L Kandel, Age Discrimina-
tion: Recent Decisions by Appellate Courts Under the Age Discrimination in Em-
ployment Act Through Mid-1993, in LITIGATION 1993, at 235, 321, (P1I Litig. &
Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. 5163, 1993) available in WESTLAW, 475
PLI/LIT 235.
173. Spence v. Maryland Cas. Co., 995 F.2d 1147, 1156 (2d Cir. 1993).
174. Pena, 702 F.2d at 325 (quoting Rosado v. Garcia Santiago, 562 F.2d 114, 119
(1st Cir. 1977)); see Spence, 995 F.2d at 1158 (holding that the plaintiff was not
found to have been constructively discharged).
175. Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957
(1972).
176. See id.
C. The Next Natural Step Is to Apply the Hostile Environment
Theory to Age Discrimination Cases
"Does not the passage of the ADEA in haec verba with Title VII
suggest that Congress intended that age discrimination be treated the
same as race discrimination?"77 When one considers the nearly iden-
tical language of the ADEA and Title VII, the legislative history be-
hind the ADEA, and the numerous substantive similarities between
the two anti-discrimination statutes, the conclusion that the two stat-
utes be treated the same becomes inescapable. In fact, the 1993 pro-
posed EEOC guidelines suggest this same conclusion.
The United States Supreme Court has specifically held, in
Lorillard v. Pons,"8 that there are a number of similarities between
the ADEA and Title VII. 79 This holding makes logical sense, since
the ADEA's prohibitions were essentially molded from Title VII's
framework." The two statutes share some identical wording, which
states, "It shall be unlawful for an employer .. . to limit, segregate,
or classify his employees in any way which would deprive or tend to
deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise ad-
versely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's
age."' 8' The two statutes are also both aimed "at related phenome-
na.'1 82 In essence, both statutes specifically attempt to eradicate
workplace discrimination."
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, however, did not include
a prohibition against age discrimination because Congress viewed age
as different from race or national origin." One reason age is con-
177. MICHAEL J. ZIMMER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
667 (A. James Gasner et al. eds., 1982).
178. 434 U.S. 575, 584 (1978); see also Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750,
756 (1979) (stating that the ADEA and Title VII have near identical language, a com-
mon purpose and share an overlapping legislative history).
179. Lorillard, 434 U.S. at 584.
180. Id. The Court noted that the two key differences between the statutes are
their remedial and procedural provisions. Id. The ADEA allows for broader recovery
because its remedial and procedural language was adopted from the FLSA, rather
than Title VII. Id.
181. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2) (1988). Title VII simply replaces 'age' with 'race, color,
sex or national origin.' 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (1988). See generally Marla Ziegler,
Disparate Impact Analysis and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 68
MINN. L. REV. 1038 (1984) (examining the use of disparate impact analysis).
182. ZIMMER ET AL., supra note 177, at 367.
183. Id.
184. See 113 CONG. REC. 31,254 (1967). At the time of Title VII's passage, there was
talk that age should be included. Instead of including age, however, the Civil Rights
Act ordered the Secretary of Labor to study the problem of age discrimination. See
113 CONG. REC. 31,250 (1967). Based on the secretary's findings, the ADEA movement
began. President Johnson issued an Executive Order declaring a public policy against
[Vol. 23: 565, 19961 Age Discrimination
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
sidered a distinct characteristic, unlike most of the characteristics
covered by Title VII," is that age is not immutable. In addition,
membership in the over-forty age group is determined by time rather
than by birth. Furthermore, age ultimately affects most people's abili-
ty to work. "
When the ADEA was first enacted, it covered people between the
ages of forty and sixty-five.'87 The Act was designed to prevent an
older worker from being discharged simply because he or she had
turned a certain age.i Eventually, Congress expanded the Act to
protect all people over the age of forty.'" The impact without the
upper age limit is that the Act undoubtedly protects workers who are
not able to perform effectively because of their advanced age. This
creates inefficiency in the workplace and tension between the compa-
ny and the employee.
The Act, however, protects the employer against this inefficiency
by providing the "bona fide occupational qualification" (BFOQ) excep-
tion.'" For the exception to apply, an age restriction must be "rea-
sonably necessary to the normal operation of the particular busi-
ness."'"' Thus, if an employer can point to specific job requirements
whereby advanced age would be a definite handicap to the safe ad-
age discrimination in employment. 1 PUB PAPERS 32 (1967). See KALET, supra note 8,
at 1-3 (providing detailed legislative history of the ADEA).
185. Although religion is not an immutable characteristic, it is encompassed under
the First Amendment guarantees. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
186. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
187. 29 U.S.C. § 631 (1976).
188. 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1988).
189. 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). In 1978 Congress amended the
ADEA to protect people between the ages of 40 and 70. Age Discrimination in Em-
ployment Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L No. 95-256 § 3(a), 92 Stat. 189, 189 (codi-
fied as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993)). In 1986 Congress
eliminated all upper age limits. Age Discrimination in Employment Amendments of
1986, Pub. L No. 99-592 § 2(c)(1), 100 Stat. 3342, 3342 (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. § 631(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993)). Some upper age limit is allowed for tenured
professors, law enforcement officers, and firefighters. 29 U.S.C. § 631(d).
190. 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(1) (1988). There are four other defenses to an ADEA action.
The first of these is when the differentiation "is based on reasonable factors other
than age." Id. The second defense is when the employer's decision is necessary "to
observe the terms of a bona fide seniority system." 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(2) (1988 &
Supp. V 1993). The third defense is where the employer's decision is necessary "to
observe a bona fide employee benefit plan." Id. Finally, the fourth defense is when
the termination or discipline is based on good cause. 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(3) (1988).
191. 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(1) (1988).
ministration of the employee's job, then the employer may dismiss
the older employee."'
Although the purpose of Title VII and the ADEA are similar,
there are a number of differences between the two statutes. "One
major substantive difference" is that "Title VII generally bars discrimi-
nation on the prohibited grounds, whereas the ADEA is far more
restrictive because of its narrow definition of 'age.""93 In other
words, Title VII protects against all racial discrimination, while the
ADEA protects individuals against age discrimination once they are
over the age of forty."
Another difference between the two federal statutes is that the
basis for discrimination under Title VII, such as race or gender, is
considered either a suspect or quasi-suspect classification by the
United States Supreme Court."' In Massachusetts Board of Retire-
ment v. Murgia,"' the Court suggested that age is inherently more
neutral than either race or national origin."' The distinction is that
older workers have not faced life-long bias, and eventually age does
affect a person's ability to work.
Even in light of these differences between the ADEA and Title
VII, there is still support for treating the two statutes in the same
manner. In fact, the EEOC advocates the similar treatment in its
192. An example of where the employer has been successful in exercising the
BFOQ defense is in the airline industry; captains are not allowed to continue their
job after the age of 60. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 122
(1985).
193. ZIMMER ET AL., supra note 176, at 365-66.
194. For instance, discrimination against race is prohibited outright, as is dis-
crimination against females. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988). However, age discrimi-
nation is not as comprehensive. Under the ADEA, a 30 year-old is not protected from
age discrimination because only individuals over the age of 40 receive protection.
There is no comparable limitation under Title VII.
195. See Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 2480 (1995) (race a suspect classifica-
tion); Adarand v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2100-01 (1995) (race is suspect distinction);
Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 n.9 (1982) (gender requires
substantially related test). Distinctions based on race, religion, and national origin are
suspect, while gender classifications are quasi-suspect. Id.; see also, Church of the
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217, 2220 (1993) (religious
classification suspect); City of Cleborne v. Cleborne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 440
(1985) (national origin classification suspect).
196. 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (per curiam).
197. The court held that age classifications are not suspect because older workers:
(1) have not "experienced a 'history of purposeful unequal treatment,'" San Antonio
Sch. Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973); (2) have not been victimized "on the
basis of stereotyped characteristics not truly indicative of their abilities," Murgia, 427
U.S. 307, 313; and (3) are not a '"discrete and insular group' in need of 'extraordi-
nary protection.'" United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4
(1938).
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most recent proposed guidelines, issued on October 1, 1993."' In
the guidelines, the EEOC sets out the criteria for a hostile environ-
ment,'" which were to apply to all the components of Title VII as
well as the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)2" and the
ADEA. 20'
During the initial comment period for these guidelines, the Com-
mission was deluged with letters both in support and opposition.2 2
198. The EEOC is a federal agency created by statute to handle all charges of dis-
criinnation under federal law. Guidelines put out by the EEOC are "accorded sub-
stantial weight in EEO [Equal Employment Opportunity] case law," although, unlike
statutes or regulations, they are not binding. MICHAEL D. LEVIN-EPSTEIN, PRIMER OF
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY 7 (3d ed. 1984).
199. The Proposed Guidelines provide in part:
(b) (1) Harassment is verbal or physical conduct that denigrates or shows
hostility or aversion toward an individual because of his/her race, color, reli-
gion, gender, national origin, age, or disability, or that of his/her relatives,
friends, or associates, and that:
i) Has the purpose or effect of creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive
work environment;
ii) Has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's
work performance; or
iii) Otherwise adversely affects an individual's employment opportunities.
(b) (2) Harassing conduct includes, but is not limited to, the following:
i) epithets, slurs, negative stereotyping, or threatening, intimidation, or hos-
tile acts, that relate to race, color, religion, gender, national origin, age or
disability; and
ii) written or graphic material that denigrates or shows hostility or aversion
toward an individual or group because of race, color, religion, gender, nation-
al origin, age, or disability and that is placed on walls, bulletin boards, or
elsewhere on employer's premises, or circulated in the workplace.
(d) An employer . . . has an affirmative duty to maintain a working environ-
ment free of harassment on any of these bases. Harassing conduct may be
challenged even if the complaining employee(s) are not specifically intended
targets of the conduct.
Guidelines Based on Race, Color, Religion, Gender, National Origin, Age, or Disability,
58 Fed. Reg. 51,266 (proposed Oct. 1, 1993 and withdrawn Oct. 20, 1994).
200. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
201. 29 U.S.C. § 623 (1988 & Supp. 1990); see Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 239
(5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972). See generally EEOC v. International
Longshoremen's Ass'n, 511 F.2d 273 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 994 (1975)
(holding that unions are an essential aspect of employment and therefore may not be
segregated by race per Title VI); Weiss v. U.S., 595 F. Supp. 1050 (E.D. Va. 1984)
(holding that a Jewish employee was subjected to a racially hostile environment
when employer repeatedly taunted him with anti-Semitic remarks).
202. For in-depth reports of the comments received, see Producer Prices: EEOC's
The primary concern with the guidelines did not involve the applica-
tion of the hostile environment theory to age discrimination, but
dealt with potential First Amendment problems regarding the inclu-
sion of religious discrimination.2"
Although the EEOC agreed to reexamine the guidelines, Congress
became embroiled in the debate. In May and June of 1994, both
houses of Congress introduced resolutions calling for the EEOC to
eliminate the religion category from the guidelines altogether."u On
June 9, 1994, the EEOC testified at a Senate Judiciary Subcommittee
that it was looking into the proposed guidelines on religious harass-
ment and stated "that any final document [would] address the wide-
ranging concerns voiced by religious organizations and others."2 5
The showdown came in July 1994 when the House added lan-
guage to appropriations legislation2" that required the EEOC to
withdraw the guidelines and to hold public hearings before they is-
sued any future guidelines.2"' Not long after, the EEOC published its
withdrawal of the guidelines in the Federal Register.0" Significantly,
the guidelines were not withdrawn because of the inclusion of age
Views of Harris, Scope of Liability Major Concerns in Comments on Harassment
Proposal, 1994 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 9, at D-23 (Jan. 13, 1994). Based on the
voluminous response, the comment period was extended on May 13, 1994 to June 13,
1994. Proposed Rule; Extension of Comment Period, 59 Fed. Reg. 24998 (1994) (to be
codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1609).
203. Proposal Seeks End to EEOC Religious Rule, 1994 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No.
108, at D-19 (June 8, 1994).
204. Id. Representative Howard McKeon of California introduced his resolution in
late May 1994 while Senator Hank Brown of Colorado introduced legislation on June
6, 1994. Id. The Senate resolution also suggested that the EEOC hold public hearings
on the matter. Id. The Senate eventually passed the resolution unanimously. Id.; see
58 Fed. Reg. 51,266 (1993) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1609) (proposed Oct. 1,
1993).
205. EEOC Promises to Address Concerns over Religious Harassment Proposal, Dai-
ly Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 110, at D-3 (June 8, 1994). The EEOC received over 50,000
comments regarding the religious issue alone. Id. at 1. The guidelines prompted fear
that "religious expression and freedom are suppressed." Id.
206. H.R. 4603, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
207. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 708, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 182 (1994) (to accompany H.R.
4603). The EEOC's budget, per the new appropriations language, was "absolutely de-
crease[d]," an EEOC official remarked. House-Passed Appropriations Bill Cuts EEOC
Budget; Restricts Religious Rules, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 159, at D-4 (Aug. 18,
1994), available in WESTLAW, BNA-DLR Database. An EEOC aide remarked that "the
feeling at the agency was that the cut was related to the religious harassment guide-
lines." Id.
208. 59 Fed. Reg. 51396-01 (1994) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1609) (withdrawn
Oct. 11, 1994). The only explanation by the EEOC was that the guidelines "did not
achieve the[ir] stated goal." Id. The guidelines were officially withdrawn by the EEOC
on October 11, 1994. Id.
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discrimination, but rather because of First Amendment concerns.
2
09
Thus, there is no reason for not pursuing guidelines similar to the
1993 EEOC guidelines minus the religious component.
The hostile environment theory should be applied to age discrimi-
nation for all the reasons mentioned above. Yet, it is also important
to adequately assess the impact of such application.
V. THE IMPACT OF APPLYING THE THEORY To AGE DISCRIMINATION
A. Potential Impact of the Theory's Adoption on Plaintiffs
District courts have come up with five basic elements of a sexu-
ally hostile environment cause of action.2 0 The first element incor-
porates the initial component of the McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green"' test mentioned earlier, requiring the plaintiff be in the pro-
tected group."' Under the hostile environment theory, the plaintiff
must then prove that she was subject to "unwelcome sexual harass-
ment" and that "such harassment was based upon sex.""3 Finally,
the plaintiff must prove that the supervisor's liability should be im-
puted to 'the employer."4
It is the fourth element pronounced by Robinson that marks a
clear departure from the McDonnell Douglas test because the victim
of a hostile environment need only show the harassment "affected a
term, condition, or privilege of employment.""' The McDonnell
Douglas standard specifically requires that the employee be dis-
charged or otherwise discriminated against in order for a plaintiff to
prevail."' Thus, the employee must have been actually or construc-
tively terminated."7 A hostile environment cause of action does not
require actual or constructive termination."8 Thus, the third and
209. Id.
210. Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1522 (M.D. Fla.
1991). The EEOC also listed what it considered the proper elements of a hostile envi-
ronment cause of action. See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
211. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
212. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1522.
213. Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1522. Robinson involved a plaintiff subjected to a
sexually hostile work environment. Id. at 1490. There is no reason to assume that
this same standard could not be applied to age cases, thus modifying the third ele-
ment to read "such harassment was based upon age," id. 1522.
214. Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1522.
215. Id.
216. See supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
217. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
218. Under a hostile environment cause of action, the plaintiff need not prove he or
fourth elements of McDonnell Douglas are simply amended for hostile
environment cases. The plaintiff, after satisfying the first two ele-
ments of the McDonnell Douglas test, would then have to set forth
the components of the hostile environment action. Once this has
been accomplished, the burden then shifts to the defendant."9
The burdens of production in a hostile environment case have in
fact remained the same. The Eggleston court concluded that where
an abusive work environment is found, "'this creates a rebuttable
presumption of [retaliation], and the burden of production shifts to
the [defendant] to articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for
the [retaliatory actions]."'22 ° Essentially, it appears that the
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting system remains intact.22" '
Eggleston also addressed the types of recovery available under
the hostile environment cause of action.222 The key issue is whether
a plaintiff, who has suffered no monetary loss but has instead been
subjected to a hostile environment, may recover monetary damag-
es.2" The plaintiff in Eggleston contended he was entitled to mone-
tary compensation because of the remedial nature of the ADEA.2
she was terminated or constructively discharged, as these are not necessary compo-
nents for an actionable hostile environment. See Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1522.
219. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
220. Eggleston v. South Bend Community Sch., 858 F. Supp. 841, 850 (N.D. Ind.
1994) (quoting McCoy v. WGN Continental Broadcasting Co., 957 F.2d 368, 371 (7th
Cir. 1992)).
221. Id. at 852. A defendant employee in a hostile environment case may not be
allowed "to introduce and rely on social context evidence." Nancy L. Abell et al.,
Recent Developments in Sexual Harassment Litigation, in SExuAL HARASSMENT LrIT-
GATION 1995 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. H4-5222,
1995), available in WESTLAW, 520 PLI/LIT 9; see Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1526
(noting that the social context argument "lacks a sound analytical basis" and "cannot
be squared with Title VII's promise to open the workplace to women"). Conversely, a
victim of a hostile environment is generally allowed to introduce "[elvidence of the
general work atmosphere, involving employees other than the plaintiff' to prove the
existence of a hostile environment. Broderick v. Ruder, 685 F. Supp. 1269, 1277 (D.
D.C. 1988). The court determined that such evidence is directly on point as to wheth-
er a hostile atmosphere existed at work. Id. at 1277-78. See generally Hicks v. Gates
Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406 (10th Cir. 1987); Sims v. Montgomery County Comm'n, 766
F. Supp. 1052 (M.D. Ala. 1990).
222. Eggleston, 858 F. Supp. at 852.
223. Id.
224. Eggleston, 858 F. Supp. at 11. The plaintiff relied on cases that allowed a
broad range of remedies. See id.; Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 112 S. Ct.
1028, 1037 (1992) (opening the door to "all appropriate remedies" for Title IX cases);
Moskowitz v. Trustees of Purdue Univ., 5 F.3d 279, 283 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that
plaintiff in age discrimination case is entitled to equitable relief, namely reinstatement
or front pay when reinstatement is not feasible, and legal or compensatory remedies);
Travis v. Gary Community Mental Health Ctr., Inc., 921 F.2d 108, 111 (7th Cir. 1990),
cert. denied, 502 U.S. 812 (1991) (holding that legal damages are allowed in age dis-
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The Eggleston court concentrated on the similarities between the
federal anti-discrimination statutes. The court stated that "'[tihe ADEA
is in some sense a hybrid of Title VII and the Fair Labor Standards
Act ("FLSA") of 1938; the prohibitions in the ADEA generally follow
Title VII, but the remedies are those of the FLSA."'225 The court
noted that there is no definitive answer regarding whether compensa-
tory damages are allowed in age discrimination cases for pain and
suffering; however, most courts conclude they are not.22 Yet the
court concluded that the plaintiff did have a legitimate claim for
compensatory damages based on the retaliation provision of the
ADEA, but held that punitive damages were unavailable.227
The biggest impact on the plaintiff depends primarily on the in-
terpretation of Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.2" It is unclear
whether the Court meant to reject the reasonable victim standard
altogether. Gender, for instance, certainly has a significant impact "on
individuals' perceptions of what constitutes sexual harassment. " "
This is why it is important to define harassment from the victim's
perspective, even if it is coupled with an objective element as a
safeguard.' In fact, the EEOC proposed just that in its 1993 guide-
lines."l
crimination cases, including punitive damages for retaliatory discharge). The defendant
relied on Espinueva v. Garrett, 895 F.2d 1164, 1165 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 497 U.S.
1005 (1990), for the proposition that "[n]either Title VII nor the ADEA authorizes
awards of compensatory or punitive damages, as opposed to "equitable" relief such as
reinstatement and back pay.
225. Eggleston, 858 F. Supp. at 852-53 (quoting BARBARA L. SCHLEi & PAUL
GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 525-27 (2d ed. 1983)).
226. Id. at 853.
227. Id. at 856 (noting that "Congress has expressly held that punitive damages are
not available under the ADEA.")
228. 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993).
229. Dolkart, supra note 80.
230. Id. See generally Lamont E. Stallworth & Martin H. Malin, Workforce Diversity,
49 DISP. RESOL J., June 1994 at 27, 31.
231.
(c) The standard for determining whether verbal or physical conduct . . . is
sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a hostile or abusive work environ-
ment is whether a reasonable person in the same or similar circumstances
would find the conduct intimidating, hostile or abusive. The "reasonable per-
son" standard includes the consideration of the perspective of persons of the
alleged victim's race, color, religion, gender, national origin, age or disability.
Guidelines Based on Race, Color, Religion, Gender, National Origin, Age, or Disability,
58 Fed. Reg. 51,266, 51,269 (proposed Oct. 1, 1993 and withdrawn Oct. 20, 1994).
In formulating its guidelines, the EEOC relied heavily on Ellison
v. Brady.2 In that case the court held that the "perspective of the
victim" should be considered when evaluating "the severity and perva-
siveness of sexual harassment. " " In Ellison, a male employee sent
his female co-worker bizarre love letters and repeatedly asked her
out. 4  While the company transferred him in response to the
woman's complaint, the male employee was later allowed to return
per a union/company agreement.' The court explained that if it fo-
cused only on what a reasonable person would do regarding harass-
ment, then the risks for discrimination would be compounded.'
Rather, the court should factor in the differences between men and
women to arrive at a just standard, for what may offend a woman
may not offend a man." /
Harris v. International Paper Co.2" adopted the same standard
and rationale as Ellison, but expanded the holding to race. 9 The
court held that the trier of fact must "walk a mile in the victim's
shoes" in order to comply with the objectives of Title VII and the
232. 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991); see also Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d
1469, 1483 (3d Cir. 1990) (adopting both a subjective and an objective reasonable
person standard for determining an actionable hostile environment); Robinson v. Jack-
sonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1523-24 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (holding that
proper perspective on the impact of harassing behavior is a reasonable woman under
the totality of circumstances approach).
233. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 878.
234. Id. at 873-74.
235. Id. at 874. The court ultimately decided that the employee did not allege a
prima facie case of sexual harassment due to a hostile working environment and
remanded the case for the resolution of factual issues. Id. at 883-84.
236. Id. at 878.
237. Id. (citations omitted); see Dolkart, supra note 80, at 186 (deducing that any
"evaluation of whether particular conduct is legally cognizable as sexual harassment
must take place from the perspective of the victim"); see, e.g., Lipsett v. University of
Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 898 (1st Cir. 1988) (reasoning that "[a] male supervisor
might believe, for example, that it is legitimate for him to tell a female subordinate
that she has a 'great figure' or 'nice legs'; the female subordinate, however, may find
such comments offensive."); see also Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 637 n.2 (6th
Cir. 1987) (holding that "men and women are vulnerable in different ways and of-
fended by different behavior.").
238. 765 F. Supp. 1509 (D. Me. 1991), vacated in part, 765 F. Supp. 1529 (D. Me.
1991). The original injunction and order was vacated to the extent that an amended
injunction was issued clarifying the terms of the original injunction. 765 F.Supp. 1529,
1530-31 (D. Me. 1991). The court amended the injunction consistent with the earlier
court's holding. Id.
239. Id. at 1516. The plaintiffs in Harris were permanent replacements at the
defendant's mill. Id. The supervisors at the mill verbally abused the plaintiffs with
racial epithets, sabotaged the plaintiffs' work, threatened to fight them, and pretended
to engage in Klu Klux Klan rituals. Id. at 1517-18.
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Maine Human Rights Act [MHRA] 4 The factfinder must be able to
comprehend the effects of such conduct and speech on the victims
in order to remedy the situation.24' Thus, the "reasonable black per-
son" standard should be applied in cases involving a racially hostile
work environment.242 The court did hasten to add that it was not
implying that all African-Americans share the same perspective.'
One problematic aspect of incorporating the reasonable victim
standard within the ambit of a hostile environment cause of action is
whether "triers of fact and third-party neutrals [must] obtain sensi-
tivity training in the social experiences of various demographic
groups to apply the victim's perspective standard meaningfully."2'
How would a twenty-three-year-old juror be able to adequately assess
a fifty-three-year-old victim of age discrimination? The courts and
legislators need to work together in creating a. workable, comprehen-
sive standard that will at least consider the victim's sensitivities.
240. Id. at 1516.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 1516 n.12. Some critics of the 1993 EEOC's reasonable person standard
note that the standard assumes that all members of a particular class think and feel
the same way. Comments on EEOC Harassment Guidelines Focus on Reasonable
Person Test, Free Speech, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 70 at D-5 (april 13, 1994), avail-
able in WESTLAW, BNA-DLR Database. Employer groups especially objected to the
individual reasonable person standard, claiming it "place[d] undue emphasis on indi-
vidual characteristics, and replaces a uniform standard of conduct with a confusing,
highly fragmented legal standard." EEOC's View of Harris, Scope of Liability Major
Concerns in Comments on Harassment Proposal, Corp. Couns. Daily (BNA) (Jan. 14,
1994), available in WESTLAW, BNA-DNEWS Database. The Equal Employment Advi-
sory Council (EEAC) attacked the standard as "suggesting that all persons of a par-
ticular race or religion or all persons of a certain age share the same perspective."
Id.
244. Stallworth & Main, supra note 230, at 32.
B. Effect on the Employe
1. Will Employers Take the Drastic Measure of Filing a
Countersuit Against Plaintiffs?"6
With the passage of federal anti-discrimination statutes, employers
now are being sued far more than any other time in history. Until
now, employers have simply built a strong defense to any charges
brought by past or current employees. It has been noted that "[t]he
explosion of harassment and discrimination claims has fueled a retal-
iatory mentality in some employers."
24 7
This possible trend could be explosive, especially in light of the
fact that one in three sexual harassment claims handled by the
EEOC resulted in a finding of insufficient evidence.4 What is the
main purpose behind the employer's actions? The court costs would
certainly be insignificant to a large company. What the companies are
really after is to deter future meritless claims by employees. 49
There are three main types of out-of-pocket costs that a company
can recover from an employee that brings a frivolous lawsuit.2 ' The
most obvious recovery is for "filing fees, transcript costs, and pho-
245. Section 1609.2(d) of the proposed guidelines advises employers to have "ex-
plicit polic~ies] against harassment that [are] clearly and regularly communicated to
employees, explaining sanctions for harassment, developing methods to sensitize all
supervisory and nonsupervisory employees to issues of harassment, and informing
employees of their right to raise and how to raise the issue of harassment under
Title VII, the ADEA, the ADA, and the Rehabilitation Act." 58 Fed. Reg. 51268 (1993)
(to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1609.26). An employer may also want to increase insur-
ance coverage for employment discrimination liability, but the availability of coverage
for intentional discrimination (and thus claims based on an abusive environment) is
controverted. Sean W. Gallagher, The Public Policy Exclusion and Insurance for
Intentional Employment Discrimination, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1256, 1256-59 (1994).
246. Failed Bias, Harassment Claimants Face Court Cost Motions, Countersuits,
Employment Poly & L. Daily (BNA) (Oct. 14, 1994), available in LEXIS, BNA Li-
brary, ELD File (relating employer's new enthusiasm for the pre-emptive action and
counter suits).
247. Id. Although Title VII and the ADEA both protect employees from retaliation
on the part of their employer, an employer may still rightly recover court costs. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id. Rafael Chodos is representing one California company against six women
who have complained of sexual harassment. Id. at 1. The company seeks to have the
court pronounce that it "properly handled the sexual harassment complaints before
the women filed charges." Id. It is a preemptive suit, whereby the employer confronts
the women head on; the company is not requesting monetary damages. Id. Raytheon
Aircraft Corporation is another example of a company that took action and recovered
costs from plaintiffs where the company felt the plaintiff did not file their action in
good faith. Id. Lawyers differ in their opinion of whether the impact of such com-
pany action acts as a deterrence to prevent future plaintiffs from filing suit. Id.
250. Id. at 2.
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tocopy expenses.""' An additional monetary remedy is available to
companies who are victims of extremely frivolous lawsuits. 52 The
most radical remedy involves companies filing a defamation or ma-
licious prosecution case.". Yet, companies must beware of the
EEOC intervening for a violation of the anti-retaliation provisions in
Title VII and the ADEA."
2. Will Businesses Be Forced to Flee Certain Geographic Areas?
A victim of age discrimination recently received $7.1 million in
damages in a California jury trial. 5 The appellate court upheld the
award, but warned:
This area of the law [discrimination cases] is quickly running out of control
and the citizens of California will be the ultimate victims and losers .... [T]t
is clear that commerce in California cannot flourish with such multi-million
dollar verdicts readily attainable . ... If the Legislature fails to act in this
area, we can see that, in due course, business enterprises will flee the
state.2r
This statement clearly reflects the court's concern with rising ver-
dict amounts. It is an important concern because it stands to reason
that more available methods of bringing an age discrimination cause
of action will lead to more costly verdicts. Thus, one possible impact
of applying the hostile environment theory to age discrimination cas-
es is that it will be the straw that breaks employers' economic
backs.
3. The Rising Cost of Jury Verdicts in Discrimination Cases
Lately, juries are awarding higher and higher dollar amounts in
discrimination cases. According to a five-year study by a California
management law firm, the average jury award is highest in sex dis-
crimination claims.257 Recent amounts of jury verdicts across the
251. Id. Depending on the nature of the lawsuit and the use of the appellate sys-
tem, this amount can range from hundreds to thousands of dollars. Id.
252. Id. As one lawyer noted, this remedy is accompanied by strict rules of applica-
tion; therefore the success rates are very low. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 2, 4.
255. Hunio v. Tishman Constr. Corp., 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 253, 256 (1993).
256. Id. at 266.
257. Average Jury Award Doubled in 1994, According to California Verdicts Sur-
vey, Employment Pol'y & L. Daily (BNA) (Oct. 27, 1994) available in LEXIS, BNA
country range from a mere $11,0002 to $89.6 million25 with a
wide range in between.'
In response to these astronomical jury awards, "a growing number
of employees . . . are being asked to sign away their right to sue in
cases involving . . . age discrimination as a condition of employ-
ment."" In fact, the 1991 United States Supreme Court in Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 2 held that an agreement to arbitrate
a statutory claim under the ADEA was valid.2"
As a result of these rising jury awards and the EEOC's backlog of
claims, employers are using mandatory private arbitration and me-
diation more and more to deal with discrimination charges;2" how-
ever, some attorneys question whether mandatory arbitration is in-
deed faster and less expensive than a courtroom trial."n Arbitration
brings with it some unique problems: "splitting of claims, parallel
arbitration and court proceedings [which can lead to increased cost],
Library, EL File.
258. Curry v. Vons Cos., No. 663750, 1994 WL 604763 (Cal. June 3, 1994) (racially
hostile environment case).
259. Jury Awards $89.6 Million on Race Bias Claims Brought by Two Former
Hughes Aircraft Employees, Employment Pol'y & L. Daily (BNA) (Oct. 31, 1994)
available in LEXIS, BNA Library, ELD File. The jury found the company liable for
racial discrimination. Id. The award consisted of $80 million in punitive damages, $4
million in economic damages and $5.5 million in noneconomic damages. Id.
260. See Simon v. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co., No. 663138, 1994 WL 679561 (Cal.
Sept. 7, 1994) (awarding $3,113,160 to victim of racial discrimination); Weddell v.
Allstate Ins. Co., No. A9111-07641, 1993 WL 0655281 (Or. Nov. 10, 1992) (awarding
$2.77 million for gender/age discrimination claim); Brocklehurst v. PPG Indus., Inc.,
865 F. Supp. 1253, 1265, 1267 (E.D. Mich. 1994) (holding that jury award of $1.5
million should .be reduced to $528,818 where employer was found liable for age dis-
crimination).
261. Frank Swoboda, Financial Workplace-Employers Find a Tool to End Workers'
Right to Sue: Arbitration, WASH. POST, Sept. 18, 1994, at H08.
262. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
263. Id. at 35 (noting the difference between the agreement described above and
"arbitration of contract-based claims [which] precluded subsequent judicial resolution
of statutory claims").
264. Concerns Raised About Trend Toward Using Alternative Dispute Process for
Bias Claims, Employment Pol'y & L Daily (BNA) (Nov. 1, 1994), available in LEXIS
BNA Library, EL) file. Some attorneys feel that the use of private mandatory arbitra-
tion in this area is contrary to the idea that a public right ought to be dealt with in
the public arena. Id. The issue ultimately is whether "an employee can contractually
waive the right to bring a lawsuit." Id. at 2; see Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2
(1988) (offering a presumption in favor of arbitration); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson
Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 35 (1991) (holding that the ADEA does not prohibit compul-
sory arbitration agreements).
265. Discrimination: Mandatory Arbitration is no Panacea, Lawyer tells Defense
Representatives, Employment Pol'y & L. Daily (BNA) (Nov. 8, 1994), available in
LEXIS BNA Library, ELD file.
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and arbitrators who are inclined to issue compromise awards in favor
of employees. "26
4. Employer's Other Alternatives
Although the hostile environment cause of action does not require
the plaintiff to have been terminated, courts have not recognized the
hostile environment in age discrimination claims; thus, the bulk of
these suits result from terminations. An employer in today's times
must carefully consider the possible effect of laying off older work-
ers-an age discrimination charge.26 The main theme of the 1993
Employment Law Seminar seemed to be the encouragement of alter-
natives to termination.2 " Thus a company might first try a voluntary
layoff before terminating an older worker.2" While employing the
use of buyouts, employers must comply with the 1990 Older Workers
Benefit Protection Act (OWBPA). 2" Attorneys advise that a company
should have plans to reduce its work force through involuntary ter-
minations in writing and ensure that the people selected for layoff
266. Id. at 1. There are also a number of practical problems associated with arbi-
tration. Id. at 2. For instance, are the individual supervisors named in the charge
subject to arbitration as well? Id. The answer may be that unless the agreement to
arbitrate specifically covers the offending supervisor, the supervisor will be handled
in court while the company will be dealt with in arbitration. Id.
267. Employers Urged to Explore Layoff Alternatives in Order to Avoid Age Dis-
crimination Claims, Employment Pol'y & L. Daily (BNA) (Nov. 8, 1994), available in
LEXIS BNA Library, ELD file [hereinafter Layoff Alternatives]. At the 18th Annual
Employment Law Seminar sponsored by the Defense Research Institute, attorneys
warned management representatives of the dangers of a discrimination charge to a
company. Id. Although the company may be restructuring to be more competitive in
the marketplace, one attorney stressed that "[b]usiness decisions that may be legally
defensible might be explosive if they ever get before a jury presented with sympa-
thetic, laid-off [sic] plaintiffs." Id.
268. Id.
269. Id. The company could offer employees incentives to leave, including buyouts.
Id. Yet the program must indeed be voluntary, or the company may face an age dis-
crimination claim. Id. at 2. For instance, suggesting that certain older workers ought
to take the buyout package would open the employer to liability. Id. To be safe,
some attorneys advise companies to hire "outside consultant[s], such as an accoun-
tant or financial planner, to advise individual workers on the consequences of taking
the voluntary buyout." Id. At a minimum, it aids relations between employer and
employee.
270. Id. See Older Workers Benefit Protection Act, Pub. L No. 101-433, 104 Sts. 978
(1990).
were not picked discriminately. 7' As an added precaution, compa-
nies must be wary of replacing older, laid-off workers with younger
employees soon after the layoffs. 7 ' One possible way to guard
against age discrimination claims by these older workers is to offer
them a "right to [re-employment] for a limited time should the work
force be expanded. The employer also might want to offer bumping
rights or even a demotion to workers who otherwise would be
cut."
273
C. First Amendment Concerns
Imagine an employer calling his employee a "has-been," a "grand-
pa," or telling him he is "too old to even drive a car, let alone work
here at this company." These statements are antagonistic toward the
employee. The question, however, is where to draw the line between
verbal workplace harassment and the free speech protections guar-
anteed by the First Amendment.274
The hostile environment theory welcomes evidence of speech that
is normally considered protected under the First Amendment: calling
someone a "grandpa" does not constitute obscenity, defamation, or
fighting words27 and is not speech that is typically substantially dis-
ruptive.276 If that is the case, then how can this speech "be used to
prove a hostile-environment" age discrimination case "without violat-
ing First Amendment free speech principles?"277 Harassment proved
via the hostile environment theory appears to "single out a particular
speech for special treatment based on its content in violation of the
First Amendment."278
While the hostile environment theory has been applied to sexual
harassment and there have not been any First Amendment constitu-
tional challenges in that context, it is worth noting that "many cases
dealing with sexual harassment have very clearly focused on conduct
271. Layoff Alternatives, supra note 267, at 1.
272. Id.
273. Id. The net effect may be a valuable employee retained at a lower salary. Id.
274. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. See generally David Schimmel, Sexual Harassment
in the Workplace: When Are Hostile Comments Actionable?, 89 EDUC. L REP. (West)
337 (1994).
275. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (holding that neither
obscenity, defamation or fighting words are protected under the First Amendment,
nor are epithets and personal abuse).
276. See generally Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503,
514 (1969) (providing a standard to restrict free speech).
277. Sorenson, supra note 96, at 9.
278. Id.
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of the most egregious sort."279 There is no employer grabbing a vic-
tim of age discrimination as often occurs with sexual harassment.
Thus it may be easier to avoid a confrontation with the Constitution
regarding sexual harassment, where "acceptable" speech is often cou-
pled with physical touching.2" This is not the usual case with ha-
rassment based on age. The safeguard for the age context is perhaps
that the language or speech must be so pervasive as to create an
adverse work environment for the employee. Thus, this qualification
of the definition of the hostile environment may be sufficient to pass
muster as a compelling interest for the state, "justifying the sup-
pression of speech in those instances where . . . harassment was
perpetrated by speech alone. " "
There is a significant impact in applying the hostile work environ-
ment to age discrimination cases. Yet, it is no more drastic a step
than when it was first applied to the components of Title VII.
VI. CONCLUSION
The future of age discrimination and the hostile environment theory
is unclear. With the withdrawal of the 1993 EEOC guidelines, there is
little push for the expansion of the hostile environment to ADEA
cases. Although the guidelines were not withdrawn because of the
inclusion of age discrimination, there has been no published activity
on pursuing similar guidelines without the controversial religious
component.
Yet even without the EEOC guidelines, the hostile environment
theory should be applied to cases under the ADEA. Case law, the
statutory language of the ADEA, and its many similarities with Title
VII all support this application. Individuals over the age of forty are
the fastest growing segment of the population and deserve the same
attention as victims of race or gender discrimination.
279. Id.
280. Id.; see also Johnson v. County of Los Angeles Fire Dep't, 865 F. Supp. 1430
(C.D. Cal. 1994). In Johnson, the fire department's sexual harassment policy forbade
firemen from reading "sexually oriented magazines" on the job. Id. at 1434. The court
held that the policy violated the First Amendment because the policy was content-
based and there was insufficient evidence showing "that the quiet reading of Playboy
contributes to a sexually harassing atmosphere." Id. at 1440; see also Tinker, 393 U.S.
503.
281. Sorenson, supra note 96, at 10.
One concern in applying the hostile environment theory to age
discrimination cases is whether it will actually be detrimental to
victims of age discrimination. The "doctrine of unintended conse-
quences" theorizes that "attempts at reform sometimes produce ef-
fects opposite to those intended."2" For instance, will companies
become more adverse to hiring older people because of the future
difficulty of letting those individuals go? The question has not been
answered. Nonetheless, this is not a sound basis for denying age dis-
crimination victims the same opportunities provided to victims of
Title VII discrimination. As Representative Burke declared in 1967, "In
the last several years, significant legislation to bar employment dis-
crimination on the basis of race, religion, color, and sex has been
enacted. It is only just that we do the same against discrimination
on the basis of age.""
JULIE VIGIL
282. Adler & Pierce, supra note 117, at 819.
283. 113 CONG. REC. 34, 742 (1967) (statement of Rep. Burke).
